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ABSTRACT

Although at least as much has been written about the aesthetic
features of Dickensfs novels as about the moral vision they embrace,
the relation between art and ethos in the Dickensian imagination has
received comparatively little critical attention. Yet the work at the
very heart of the Dickens canon, Little Dorrit, demands to be read in
terms of its broad structural and thematic concern not only with the
idea of fiction as an equally moral and aesthetic system but, more
precisely, with the idea of fiction as a form of mediation between
a public, literal world and a private and imaginative one.
Such an idea governs the novel on at least two levels, each worthy
of the comprehensive examination the present thesis attempts to afford.
In the first place, characters in Little Dorrit so consistently orient
themselves to social, psychological, and.even spiritual realities by
translating them into equivalent fictions that virtually everyone in
the novel emerges as a kind of amateur novelist. By testing what
amounts to an epistemology of imagination — in which what is known
is known largely through acts of fancy — Dickens reflects the
nineteenth-century impulse to respond to life in the fictional mode,
an impulse that can be seen as clearly in the novelistic prose of
Carlyle, Ruskin, and Newman as in the Victorian novel itself.
In the second place, if, as Ian Watt suggests, the novel in
general may be roughly defined as a uniquely and essentially realistic
literary genre, the question of how any prose narrative orients itself
to reality by converting a social universe into a fictional one
v
deserves consideration. Its concern with the efficacy of fictionalization
as a technique of adaptation to experience makes Little Dorrit an ideal
object of inquiry. A study of what might be called the will to
fictionalization in the novel, the thesis addresses the larger question
of how any novel responds to the world outside itself, and explores
another subject central to Little Dorrit — the role and responsibility
of the artist.
In Little Dorrit Dickens regards art (and especially rhetorical
art) as a potential bridge between various spheres of human activity
and experience and so ultimately as a category of moral expression. The
novel reflects a fascination with the nature of fiction at once
peculiar to Dickens, and, in a broader sense, common to both the age
and genre in which he wrote. But it also shows Dickens developing a
more concrete and complex definition of fiction that critics of the novel
have in the past been willing to admit. Thus while the present thesis
focuses on the dynamics of the central themes of fiction and imaginative
translation, its wider emphasis is upon the Dickensian conception of
the nature and purpose of art.
iv

To advance the claim that Little Dorrit is a novel about novels,
br simply that it is a novel about itself, would be to perform at best
an exercise in critical extremism and at worst an act of academic
vanity.

But post-modernism aside, one of the central observations

to be made about the work at the heart of the Dickens canon is that
in Little Dorrit imagination mediates all experience and fictionalization
emerges as an essential mode of orientation to reality.

"Narrative,”

writes Barbara Hardy, "cannot be regarded simply as an aesthetic
invention used by the artist in order to control, manipulate, order,
and investigate the experiences of that life we tend to separate from
art, but must be seen as a primary act of mind transferred to art
from life."*

Just so, Dickens's conception not merely of narrative

but of fiction in general may be understood at all only when it is
understood as a "primary act of mind" so bound up with perception as
to be inseparable from it.
"To begin my life at the beginning of my life, I record that I
was b o m , ” announces David Copperfield, anticipating the fusion of
imaginative and existential activity increasingly conspicuous in Dickens.
Quite as, for David, being b o m and writing about being b o m conflate,
the living of life and its rewriting in imagination become in
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Little Dorrit indistinguishable.

In the later novel, however, Dickens

allows an omniscient narrative eye to examine the dynamics and im
plications of such rewritings:

individually and collectively characters

invariably attempt to convert experience into some version of itself
that will be tolerable psychologically and acceptable socially.
In the first-person narratives preceding Little Dorrit —
any first-person narrative —

as in

life and fiction must be coterminous;

memory is simultaneously factitious and inventive; history is story.
Thus without calling into question either her veracity as the author
of her experience or her right tobe so, Esther Summerson can write
near the end of Bleak House: f,I have suppressed none of my many
weaknesses on that subject £the subject of Allen Woodcourt], but
have written them as faithfully as my memory has recorded them.11~
Little Dorrit, on the other hand, concentrates on the techniques
whereby its villains and its heroes alike internalize reality only by
translating it into fiction.

Hence when near the end of the novel

Dickens introduces the 11History of a Self-Tormentor" he also introduces
a question quite literally of authority.

Miss Wade*s masterpiece of

translation dramatizes the imaginative machinations which have con
stituted most psychic activity in
their subjectivity.

the novel, and calls

attention to

Moreover, itis precisely because in the course

of the preceding 700 pages Dickens has examined those machinations
objectively that the mental acts whereby Miss Wade does not, as she
claims, 11habitually discerfn] the truth"^ but rather fabricates a
psychologically fatal fiction reveal themselves for what they are:
methods whereby the ego invades, conquers, recreates, and potentially
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either clarifies or destroys the real.

I
n *Why, will you pretend for to say,1 returned the
Captain, *that they don’t distinguish the old from
the young there as well as here?1
•They don11 make no distinguishments at all,1 said
she. •They*re vastly too polite.1"
— Fanny Burney, Evelina
Although an underlying conception of fiction as epistemology
discloses itself to even a casual survey of the text, few studies
of Little Dorrit have acknowledged the sheer ubiquitousness of the
fictions it encompasses, let alone their efficacy to the consciousnesses
which generate them.

Nor has any study taken the prevalence of fiction

as a point of origin for a comprehensive consideration of the novel
as a work of and "about the moral imagination."

4

Janice M. Carlisle

concludes that Little Dorrit concerns "the moral limits of the
c
imagination,"-' but alludes only to the limitations that ultimately
incomprehensible life imposes upon the novelist who attempts to
record it accurately.

In short, a puzzling critical myopia has pre

cluded thorough analysis not just of the nature and function of
fiction in the novel but, further, of the extent to which Dickens’s
conception of fictive imagination qualifies Little Dorrit*s moral,
social* and psychological design.
Certainly the novel*s preoccupation with "genteel fictions" has
always intrigued scholars.

Yet of recent critics only Carlisle has

confronted the active role "good" characters play in upholding the
illusions of gentility generally associated with odious Society.

Other examinations of the imaginative lives of characters in the novel
usually assume, with Peter Christmas, a false polarity in which reality
equals absence of fiction equals truth equals goodness, and appearance
equals fiction equals fictive gentility equals evil*

John Holloway,

for example, declares emphatically that in Little Dorrit “seeming
imprisons reality,*1^ and Roger Lund decides that the novel's concern
with fiction extends only to 11a fictional examination of an entire
society built upon sands of hypocrisy, sham, and affectation.11?

By

the same token, interpretations like Carlisle's make too few distinctions
among the kinds of fictionalization Little Dorrit illustrates.
Carlisle absolves Amy Dorrit of her prevarications on the marshy
grounds that, given verisimilitude and mimesis as artistic ideals, the
ambiguous and fundamentally amoral nature of reality necessitates
the abandonment of 11a straightforward and conventionally 'moral*
Q
posture” in favor of a more ambivalent one.
Elaine Showalter and Janet Larson assume that since Dickens was a
fictionist his attitude toward anything created by the imagination
could not have been other than inconclusive; like Carlisle, both critics
do perceive the possibility that fictions can be useful as well as
detrimental to the psyche, or to the society, that generates them.
But also like Carlisle, neither Showalter nor Larson recognizes the
extent to which Dickens vindicates fictionalization not only as a
primary but also as a primarily moral act of mind,

Showalter, for

example, concedes that “in order to preserve minimal self-esteem,
[Marshalsea] inmates construct protective fictions, 'sad tales,' and
false histories which allow self-pity to dominate their relationships
with ot h e r s , a n d even sees Dickens himself to employ certain tactful

and circumlocutory narrative devices (e.g., the use of doubles) in
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order to protect the novelist*s own identity as a “benevolent figure.11
Showalter, however, concerns herself only with forms of lying that
preserve secrets and defend neurotic selves terrified of exposure:
fiction in bono emerges as little more than a thinly disguised

version of fiction in malo. Likewise, Randolph Splitter’s (psycho)analysis
of the imaginative constructions characters erect in the course of
the novel finds those constructions mere strategies designed to
expiate guilt symbolically; in addition, the “artifice" of the novel
itself derives from the "artificer*s“ neurasthenic desire to convince
himself “that the nightmare of modem society is only a nightmare, a
dream, a fiction, after all."

11

Conversely^ but no less narrowly, Garrett Stewart supposes the
imaginative impulse in Little Dorrit an essentially good one which
allows its “heroes" (especially Arthur Clennam, with Little Dorrit*s
assistance) to escape from the oppressive confines of reality into
an "idyll in imagination."

His hearty approbation of the imaginative

faculty prevents Stewart from considering the equally imaginative but
finally imprisoning “genteel fictions" so beloved of earlier critics,
and he quite overlooks the extent to which Clennam* s fancies serve
less to liberate than to isolate him.' At most, Stewart can only
remark that fancies like those of Flora Finching appear to be somewhat
"inefficacious"
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—

for the most part, he too neglects to identify

the crucial differences among the imaginative acts Dickens dramatizes
in Little Dorrit.
This critical tendency to “make no distinguishraents at all" has
sanctioned a proliferation of partial illuminations of the novel

which fail both to make comprehensive sense of its explicitly narrative
texture and to appreciate a source of unity fully as rich in implication
as the famous prison symbol.

It has further prevented scholars from

relating Dickensfs aesthetic interest to the social and moral determi
nations he makes.

For Ian Watt, however, it is social 11realism” that

distinguishes the novel from other genres; the novel is special
because it refers to a 11reality which it imitates.11^

Furthermore,

of all novels the Victorian would seem most intimately and directly
concerned with an actuality primarily social.

In a study of Carlyle,

Macaulay, and Newman as imaginative writers, George Levine points out
that in the Victorian conception "the crucial obligation of art is to
be faithful to the real because it is in the real that people must
live.

And art’s function is to extend man’s capacity to sympathize

with the creatures of the ordinary world among whom he must live.11^
Such a directive unquestionably underlies Little Dorrit. Nothing
of course absolutely requires that Dickens unite his analysis of the
art and act of fiction with the social responsbility incumbent upon
the nineteenth-century novelist.

Nevertheless, Lionel Trilling’s

pronouncement that "Little Dorrit is about society. . . . It is more
about society than any other of the novels. . .~. It is about society
in its very essence" ^ conforms even to the most general impression
one forms of a novel originally intended as social satire.

And indeed

it is scarcely as if critics have not attempted to show the relation
between the fictions evolved and perpetuated in Little Dorrit and the
social vision the novel achieves.

On the contrary, they have clung

with a tenacity worthy of the Barnacles themselves to the image of
Society as a tawdry illusion, which like the Marshalsea and Bleeding
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Heart Yard engages in "daily travesties of community" ^ and whose
cultivated "surfaces" must be "broken through by the emancipating
1 ft
reality underneath."A

Yet because limited to narrow perspectives on the techniques of
fictionalization Dickens explores in the course of Little Dorrit,
critical examinations of the connection between fiction and society
inevitably shortchange themselves.
picturesque in the novel —

Even Nancy Hill*s study of the

although it finds satire of an aesthetic

standard to double as social satire —

concludes only that Dickens

"condemns" a "point of view substantially formed by the picturesque.,
the view that valued appearance more than substance, that believed
surface could conceal sham."

19

The relation between art and society

in Little Dorrit remains infinitely more complex than will be
apparent as long as fictions (ergo the society they unite) are
invariably "bad" and continue to be regarded as something less than
mental constructs that are ultimately as necessary and inevitable
as Kantian categories of space and time to the apprehension of reality.
The real issue in Little Dorrit declares itself to be less the
moral imagination, or the moral limits of the imagination, than the
moral use of a perceptual donnee which turns out to be the imagination.
If one begins with the premise Dickens articulates in the course of
the novel —

fictions are necessary not, as Carlisle claims, because

life itself has become so labyrinthine and indeterminate that it can
only be confronted with lies, but rather because they permit the
individual to orient himself to perplexing experience —

numerous

possibilities for interpretation surface, especially with respect
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to the novel*s social dimensions.

Trilling quite correctly noted that

one of Dickens *s main concerns lies -with "society in its very essence,11
and subsequent critics have correctly if implicitly identified that
essence as fiction.

Not simply "genteel," however, "fiction" in the

novel demands to be construed as a primary and valuable source of social
cohesion, and as a mode of communication and mutual comprehension as
indispensable to social intercourse as to private psychic activity.
Indeed, its social indispensability derives from its psychological
inevitability.

Little Dorrit encounters society in the abstract as

well as Society in the concrete; the conclusions it reaches likewise
transcend the notion of Society as sham.

Even more important, the

relation between aesthetic and morality — between fiction and moral
responsibility —

in the Dickensian imagination becomes apparent once

one begins to examine the mechanics and the dynamics of the imaginative
exchanges whereby something becomes nothing, poverty aristocracy,
and imprisonment liberation.

II
"The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power
and prime Agent of all human Perception,,and as a repe
tition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation
in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I con
sider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the
conscious will. . . . It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates,
in order to recreate. • . • It is essentially vital,
even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed
and dead. Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters
to play with but fixities and definites. The Fancy is
indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from
the order of time and space.
— Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, xiii
Structurally and thematically Little Dorrit appears to arrange

10.
itself into constellations of opposites.

The "simple and radical con*

trasts"^0 adumbrated in the "sun and shadow" of the opening chapter
would seem to inform the novel at every level of its organization.
Thus Book One ("Poverty") counterpoints Book Two ("Riches"); mammoth
and stationary^ the prison symbol finds its antithesis in the motif of
"restless travellers" perpetually "climbing the dusty hills and toiling
along the weary plains, journeying by land and journeying by sea,
coming and going so strangely" (p. 6?).

Throughout the narrative

something and Someone oppose nothing and Nobody, and characters fall
into contrasting dyads, so that the voluble Flora Finching appears
almost inevitably in the company of her cryptic legacy, Mr. F.fs Aunt;
enormous Maggy faithfully accompanies the diminutive Little Dorrit;
Pancks, "the little coaly steam tug," is frequently to be found with
the "unwieldy ship" Christopher Casby in tow.
The dichotomies that form the novel* s surface on virtually every
front encourage a number of assumptions about its true design.

It

seems logical, for example^ to suppose that one of the principal
dualities in Little Dorrit will comprise truth and falsehood, fiction
and reality, art and life.

Hence Janet Larson concludes that "the

novel insists upon the saving power of ±he Real and teaches the perils
of F i c t i o n , a n d Carlisle declares that in investigating the "instances
in which characters create ‘fictions* to hide the ‘reality* of their
feelings" she is simply examining "one aspect of the contrast" between
22
seeming and being.
An examination of the true nature of the
dramatic juxtapositions that seem to govern Little Dorrit, however,
reveals, quite simply, that no contrast in the novel is simple or, in
the end, can be regarded as more than superficially a contrast.

In
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fact, Dickens insists upon underlying affinities between opposites
and ultimately upon their eradication.
For the relation between "fiction" and "reality," the subversion
of all dichotomy acquires two implications.

In the first place,

although the novel witnesses the transformation of disparate entities
into their polar opposites, this transformation is seldom if ever
entirely objective.

Rather, it comes about through the agency of

various consciousnesses in the novel, and it comes about with a per
sistence suggestive of inevitability.

In the second place, the

division between fiction and reality, like that between any other pair
of traditionally yoked opposites, becomes indeterminate.

Just as

characters incessantly convert nothing into something and something
into nothing, poverty into riches and darkness into light, so, invariably,
they convert countryside into landscape, human group into tableau
vivant, life into still life, reality into its fictional representation.
In Little Dorrit art emerges as the psychic process which accomplishes
that conversion.

Mutatis mutandis, each character must be seen as a

kind of artist engaged in the active and creative construction of a
private version of reality.
Near the middle of Book One Amy Dorrit descends into the theatrical
underworld.

There she discovers "a maze of dust, • • . where there

was such a confusion of unaccountable shapes of beams, bulkheads,
brick walls, ropes, and rollers, and such a mixing of gaslight and
daylight, that they seemed to have got on the wrong side of the
pattern of the universe" (p. 279)*

Just so, the visible universe

Dickens creates in the course of Little Dorrit demands to be seen not,
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as Douglas Hewitt would have it, "in terms of violent contrasts,
23
striking paraUels, repetitions"
but rather in terms of patterns
merging tirelessly into anti-patterns, of designs always busy turning
themselves inside out and upside down. Little Dorrit occupies less
Oh.
a "world in reverse"
governed by static paradigms which presuppose
clear distinctions between unequivocal opposites than a world in
reversal ruled by volatile principles of conversion.
To begin with the simplest and most obvious case in point, the
novel1s encompassing framework depends only nominally upon a contrast
between "Poverty" and "Riches."

In his extreme indebtedness William

Dorrit embodies poverty, yet his pretensions to gentility, like those
of his equally impoverished offspring, escalate incdirecti proportion!to
his insolvency.

"It is certain that the more reduced and necessitous

they were, the more pompously the skeleton [[fabricated "for the overawing
of the College"]] emerged from its tomb" (pp. 277-78).

The Dorrits and

the Marshalsea collegians indefatigably convert their condition —
indigence —

into its contrary —

affluence.

More important, Dickens

emphasizes only secondarily coexistent and contradictory states of
destitution and illusory aristocracy, concentrating instead on the
mysterious and subtle processes whereby for virtually all purposes of
action material absence (poverty) becomes metaphysical presence (wealth).
Testimonials and related rituals make up the prison life; the act of
conversion supplants in importance the conversion itself, and William
Dorrit retains his status only through repeated verbal and otherwise
symbolic attestations to its existence.
On one level, Amy Dorrit*s incessant labor confirms her family*s
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impoverishment: as Blandois suggests, a gentleman does not work (11*Have
you ever thought of looking to me to do any kind of work? • • .No!
You knew, from the first moment when you saw me here, that I was a
gentleman? • • • Haha!

You are right!

A gentleman X am!8,1 []p. 4?]]) •

On at least two other levels, however, the relation between Amy,s
willingness to work and the Dorrits1 poverty is dramatic rather than
static.

That willingness not only encourages "the family fiction" that

"was the family assertion of itself against her services" (p. 280) ,
but even turns out to be an activity designed, not unlike the elaborate
Testimonial ceremonies, to preserve the illusion of gentility.

Indeed,

in a grotesque parody of the act of earning, work becomes a way to
convert "prison mendicity" into "fictive riches," for "over and above
other daily cares , the Child of the Marshals ea had always upon her the
care of preserving the genteel fiction that they were all idle beggars
together" (p. 114).

Amyfs wages go toward the maintenance of the one

grand illusion that makes up her fatherfs life, and toward the
dissolution of the novel*s antipodal structure.
Abetted by his fellow inmates* obliging participation in conversion
rituals, and by his younger daughter*s active efforts to protect the
fagade that ultimately defines him, "William the bond" is functionally
identical to the great and wonderful Merdle.

Always "receiving homage"

from the collegians of Society, Merdle represents the annihilation of
all distinction between "Poverty" and "Riches," an annihilation effected
only through the agency of the collective imagination.

Merdle*s wealth

turns out to be a fabrication made possible by the monetary and moral
confidence invested in him.

Society (comprising both society in general

and Society in particular) essentially imagines him into being.

The

Merdle legends that circulate in Bleeding Heart Yard ("his ways being,
as you might say and utter no falsehood, paved with gold" £p. 628]]) only
reiterate the mythic grandeur with which society at large endows "the
rich man, who had in a manner revised the New Testament, and already
entered the kingdom of Heaven" (p. 673) • Of course, Merdle1s assets
show themselves to be nothing more than "ethereal vapour,.. .. • moonshine,"
fully as insubstantial as the communal fantasies that transform a
veritable prince of darkness into "the shining wonder, the new con
stellation to be followed by the wise men bringing gifts" (p. 777)*
The Merdle speculations by definition involve a kind of profane
transubstantiation in which nothing seems able to become something, and
indeed appears to do so.

But, significantly, even had Merdle*s wealth

existed independent of public belief in its reality, it would have re
mained nothing:

intrinsically worthless, money acquires value only in

terras of that for which it may be exchanged, and social fancy
ultimately makes nothing out of nothing. 2‘y

Merdle himself destroys

binary oppositions that, because destructible, prove never to have
existed in the first place, and thus Barnacle, with ironic accuracy,
pronounces him "one of the greatest converters of the root of all evil
into the root of all good" (p. 297)*
Dickens by no means restricts the metamorphosis of "Poverty" into its
equally intangible counterpart to simple reversals of fortune, or to the
converging biographies of William Dorrit and Mr. Merdle.

"Genteel" at

last, Dorrit in fancy exchanges his newly acquired wealth for the old
life of poverty and. indebtedness and in the end "kn[ows]] nothing beyond
the Marshalsea."

Although initially Dorrit*s imagination transposes only

past and present, so that during his "collapse in good company" he

merely reassumes the role he played throughout his imprisonment, the
real transposition takes place between wealth and impoverishment, and
Dorrit spends his last days in a sumptuous bedchamber sending his
possessions "piece by piece, to an imaginary pawnbrokerfs" (p. 712).
The end of the novel affirms in a different way that the relation of
poverty to riches is one less of irreconcilable opposition than of
affinity underscored by a common unreality.

The affinity itself

originates in the mediating power of the imagination, which finds
equally illusory both the presence of money and its absence, and
so negotiates freely between them.

Declaring her "*own great fortune1"

to be "fnothing in the w o r l d ( p . 885), Amy Dorrit converts material
poverty into metaphysical riches ("*I never was rich before. . . .*"),
quite transforming one of the central contrasts in the novel.

The

codicil-burning verifies not only that transformation, but further
the unique power of the imagination to effect.it.

The suppressed

codicil indicates definitely neither financial gain on Amy’s part
nor financial loss on the part of the Clennam trust.

It is simply

1,1anything you like best*" (p. 893)*
The point at the moment is less to argue for the wider implications
of such transactions between contrasting poles than to suggest that
Little Dorrit asks to be read as a universe of opposites continually
dissolving into each other under the auspices of the imagination.
More than anything else, the novel*s dynamic is one of movement, of
translation and change reflected in chapter headings ("Moving in
Society"; "Machinery in Motion") and in motifs of literal translation
which center on interpretation itself, so that more important than
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Cavallettofs Italian or its English equivalent are Mrs. Flemish*s
happy compromises between the two.

Hampton Court exemplifies the

structural and thematic translations that penetrate the deepest
levels of the novel and undermine even its most emphatically stated
polarities, subordinating all of them to the image of a world in
transition.

Dickens*s narrative catches in the act of transformation

the glorified tents of the "gipsies of gentility":
There was a temporary air about their establish
ments, as if they were going away the moment they
could get anything better. . . . Genteel blinds
and makeshifts were more or less observable as
soon as their doors were opened; screens not half
high enough, which made dining rooms out of arched
passages; . • . curtains which called upon you
to believe that they didn*t hide anything; panes of
glass which requested you not to see them; many
objects of various forms, feigning to have no
connection with their guilty secret, a bed (p. 359)*
Even sun and shadow merge by the end of the narrative, when "the last
day of the appointed week touched the bars of the Marshalsea gate.
Black, all night, since the gate had clashed upon Little Dorrit, its
iron stripes were turned by the early-glowing sun into stripes of
gold" (p. 831).
It will be seen at once that all the dismantled antitheses in
Little Dorrit ultimately express, synecdochally, the wider antithesis
that encompasses them —
of critics.

the fiction and reality opposition so beloved

One knows, of course, that the Dorrits are actually in

debt, that Hampton Court really is as cramped and noisome as it pretends
not to be.

But in dissolving dichotomies —

in concentrating on the

symbolic acts that effect such dissolutions, and on the process of
dissolution itself — Dickens also appears to dissolve the old

17.
familiar seeming and being antinomy.

Just as the novel confronts

squarely no unequivocal example either of Riches or of Poverty, and
no situation in which empirical and imagined destitution coexist, so
all customary distinctions between reality and the versions of reality
characters create for themselves evaporate.

Indeed** the primary

conversion in Little Dorrit, and the one in which characters engage
.even as they conceive of imprisonment as liberation, or of indebtedness
as solvency, is of life into a representation of life.
The Dickensian technique of disclosing unexpected and startling
similarities between seemingly dissimilar characters reaches its
zenith in Little Dorrit, where characters like John Chivery and
Edmund Sparkler, Christopher Casby and William Dorrit, Mr. Meagles
and Mrs. Merdle, make very unlikely bedfellows indeed.

Dickens

establishes one of the most perplexing affinities in the novel,
however, between Amy Dorrit and Mr. Merdle.

In Italy, "all [Amy]

saw appeared unreal; the more surprising the scenes , the more they
resembled the unreality of her own inner life as she went among its
vacant places all day long" (p. 517)•

Little Dorrit is incontestably

one of Dickens*s most virtuous characters; yet in Book One one of
his most unequivocal villains, Mr. Merdle, likewise "looked out of
nine windows in succession, and appeared to see nine wastes of
space",(p. 449).

Little Dorrit itself does not offer a sharper

moral disparity than the one between Amy and Merdle, but the two
manage to share the one perceptual habit common to everyone around
them, and so habitually transform what they see into a fanciful
version of itself.

Perhaps paradoxically, only when Merdle and Amy

are understood to orient themselves to experience in the same way do
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the true and crucial differences between their perspectives reveal
themselves.

Otherwise, the "vacant spaces" Amy sees appear equivalent

to the "wastes of space" that rise to meet Merdle*s eyes.
The medieval conception of fantasy as a cognitive process which
accurately reproduces sense impressions and presents them to the
organizing mind finds its nineteenth-century avatar in Little Dorrit,
where fantastic translations of life into representations of life
transpire continually.

Even in Book One, long before the Dickensian

sleight of pen that changes an entire country into a painted landscape,
William Dorrit occupies the position of a "serious picture in the
obscure gallery of the Marshalsea" (p. 273)*

Just so, Dickens depicts

most of the members of the Dorrit family as "avenging illustration^]"
in a "satire on family pride" (p. 277) • Such descriptive devices
merely objectify a psychological or epistemic disposition to replace
the actual with the artificial, and, in a related vein, to substitute
the subjective (the inner world the mind creates for itself) for the
objective (the world external to and independent of the creative mind).
Blandois provides an extreme but apt example of a kind of
self-reflexive alchemy that renders even self-consciousness (and
self-approbation) acts of aesthetic appreciation/ nlI love and study
the picturesque in all its varieties,*" Blandois boasts.
been called picturesque myself1" (p. 408).

"fI have

Blandois fashions his own

"picturesque"'being so skillfully that the artificer himself becomes
artificial.

Blandois considers "genuine" and "picturesque," "nature"

and "character" synonymous, and the ease with which he exchanges one
name and identity for another testifies to his imaginative dexterity.
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But as D. W. Jefferson notes, Blandois "exists to create the impression
of something which is not there,"
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’
and one can go even further to

argue that Blandois is "not there": in fabricating himself he simply
illustrates the double truth of the maxim that nothing will come of
nothing.

Thus when Flintwinch ventures that he may be "not of a

pious cast," Blandois rejoins:
part of my character.
imaginative.

,,(t0n the contrary. . • . It's a

I am sensitive, ardent, conscientious, and

A sensitive, ardent, conscientious, and imaginative man,

Mr. Flintwinch, must be that, or nothing!1" In turn, there appears "an
inkling of suspicion in Mr. Flintwinch1s face that he might be
nothing" (p . 408) .
The caricature of a villain, Blandois seems always to be stepping
either into or back out of a melodrama.

Even Henry Gowan (whom Miss

Wade perceives as "the dressed-up Death in the Dutch series" []p. 732])
finds "a pleasure in setting up Blandois as the type of elegance, and
making him a satire upon others who piqued themselves on personal
graces" (p. 5^2).

In much the same way, Arthur Clennam comes upon

the eminent Tite Barnacle, who "seemed to have been sitting for his
portrait to Sir Thomas Lawrence all the days of his life" (p. 152)
and who, in Merdle's company, shares "a strong general resemblance to
the two cows in the Cuyp picture over them" (p. 6l6).

The impulse

to turn all experience into a fictive representation of experience
asserts itself in Italy as well as in England.

Returning from the

latter country, William Dorrit can only establish a primarily
aesthetic distance between himself and the sight of his brother and
younger daughter together before the firs:

"Allowing for the great

difference in the still-life of the picture, the figures were much
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the same as of old; his brother being sufficiently like himself to
represent himself, for a moment, in the composition11 (p. 699)-

Even

Edward Sparkler translates what he sees into a "composition with Miss
Fanny in the foreground" (p. 515)Sitting in Casby*s house, Arthur Clennam recognizes imagination
as the necessary mode of apprehension it is:

"In a word, it was re

presented (Clennam called to mind, alone in the ticking parlour*) that
many people select their models, much as the painters just now
mentioned, select theirs" (p. 190).

Indeed, the passage emphasizes

not that some "people select their models," whereas others do not,
but rather that "many people select their models" while others have
their models thrust upon them.

The ubiquitous reliance upon "models"

equalizes everyone in the novel.

On the surface, little distinguishes

Mrs. Gowan, who with a turn of the tongue reduces the Meagleses to the
"Miggleses," from the Meagleses themselves, who make Harriet Beadle
into Tattycorara.

Mrs. Gowan*s imaginative transpositions replace

an actuality with its mirror image, false, desirable, exactly inverting
the thing it reflects:

"With the utmost politeness and good-breeding,

she feigned that it was she —

not [Mr. Meagles*] — who had made the

difficulty, and who at length gave way; and that the sacrifice was
hers — not his" (p. ^40).

Similarly, the Meagleses also alter

experiential givens in order to make the world habitable for themselves,
not only in the sense that Pet*s dead twin is 111changed . . . according
to the changes in the child spared to us and always with us1" (p. 58),
but also in the more disturbing sense that the Tattycoram they create
is designed to corroborate a comfortable (and inaccurate) world view.
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111Why, she was called in the Institution Harriet Beadle,1,1 Mr. Meagles
explains, 1,1 —

an arbitrary name, of course*

Now, Harriet we changed

into Hattey, and then into Tatty, because, as practical people, we
thought even a playful name might be a new thing to her, and might
have a softening and affectionate kind of effect, donft you see?
to Beadle, that I neednft say was wholly out of the question.

As

If

there is anything that is not to be tolerated on any terms . . .

it

is a beadle111 (p. 57).
In much the same way, Arthur Clennara frequently finds "himself a
long way on the road to a number of airier and less substantial
destinations11 than the ones that actually await him (p. 231).

But

William Dorrit also consistently and even compulsively builds 11castles
in the air1' that so insinuate themselves into the deceptively simple
act of observation that he fails to notice his surroundings. And
Affery, resident equally of haunted house and haunted mind, effects
the quintessential transformation of matter into mental energy, until
all experience presents itself to her in the guise of a dream.

Yet

Dickens suggests a disconcerting parallel between Affery and Amy Dorrit,
who also seems to perceive much of the worll in terms of what it is
not.

Looking into Arthur Clennan^s “dim room," for instance, she sees

"a spacious one . . . and grandly furnished," informed by her own
"courtly ideas of Covent Garden . . . costly ideas of Covent Garden
. • . picturesque ideas of Covent Garden" (p. 208).

The other guests

at the "party" she attends later in the chapter are in reality nothing
more than stars, yet "such a vista of wonder opened out before her,
that she sat looking up at the stars, quite lost" (p. 217).
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In short, the question of "distinguishments" poses itself again
and again.

It seems impossible to condemn the fictive lenses through

which Mrs. Gowan, William Dorrit, and Affery view the world without
condemning all of the imaginative acts in the novel.

Part of the

difficulty of making distinctions stems from the very nature of the
world Dickens figures forth in Little Dorrit, for this world stead
fastly resists its own figuring forth, and remains to the last a
shadowy, mysterious, and finally incomprehensible nether-region
where conclusions must be at last inconclusive.

Objective indeterminacy

throws the mind back upon its own resources in its struggle to orient
itself to experience; the transmutation of what seems to be into its
opposite simply furnishes one method of rendering the world sensible,
hence tolerable.
of itself —

The recasting of experience into a fanciful version

into a picture or a dream —

supplies another.

Only a

closer examination of related techniques of representation, however,
finds any sort of consistent correspondence between what one senses
to be the novel*s moral truth and the aesthetic determinations it
makes.

Yet the transgressions and abuses of the evil characters and

institutions in Little Dorrit ultimately identify themselves as
transgressions against and abuses of the imagination.which, because a
necessary accomplice to perception and comprehension, emerges as a
defining feature of humanity.

Likewise, Dickens at last locates the

chief moral and social good in the conscionable use of the imaginative,
and specifically of the narrative, faculty.
"Society, the Circumlocution Office, and Mr. Gowan," Dickens said
27

of Little Dorrit, "are of course three parts of one idea and design." f
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Although Dickens referred to the satirical dimensions of the novel,
Society, the Circumlocution Office, and "Mr. Gowan" are also three
parts of the same imaginative design, for each of them embodies some
perversion of the artistic act.

In dramatizing those perversions,

Dickens measures also the dimensions of any aesthetic enterprise, in
much the way that any satirical distortion ultimately emphasizes the
right and desirable proportions of what it depicts in exaggerated form.
Imaginative failures in Little Dorrit reflect less an inability to
fictionalize experience than a deeper failure to apprehend a trans
literal reality.

Culpability originates in the fact that although the

ego apparently cannot choose but view the world through a scrim of
reverie, it nonetheless retains a great deal of choice about what it
will represent to itself, and about how it will represent it.
Mrs. Gowan congratulates her friend Mrs. Merdle upon "represeni£ing[]
and expressing] Society so well" (p. 44l) , and indeed both women —
both of whom consider heart and Art reciprocal metaphors rather than
the metonyms they should be —

stand in synecdochal relation to Society,

and to the kind of art in which Society engages.

That species of art

may be summarizes as the art of varnishing, and its particular reprehensibility lies not so much in the fact that its way of converting
apprehended moral realities is to efface them entirely as in the
corollary to that fact:

such effacement requires the conscious and

deliberate rejection of the possibility of representing reality accurately,
and so becomes a sin both of omission and of commission.
Varnishing, Dickens stresses, is not an involuntary act; nearly
always it follows a necessarily imaginative perception of some true state

Hdng the empirical smokescreen.

The real wretchedness

#
is more apparent to the members of Society than to
'*'1
■
t tf the ardor of their efforts to repress and deny it
evidence of that truth, Mrs. Merdle*s rhetorical
It is Mrs. Merdle who somehow manages to impart central
* *.v'i@ty at the same time that she turns her back upon
not in our natural state,111 Mrs. Merdle remarks,

*

"•Society suppresses us and dominates us111 (p. 286).
Mrs. Gowan 11of course saw through her own threadbare
*■:*

and . • • knew that Mrs. Merdle saw through it perfectly,
that Society would see through it perfectly,11 and yet
of "immense complacency and gravity" (p. Wt).
because Fanny knows down to the last screw the mechanisms
y operates that she becomes such a singular sensation.

I*IvAtion of surfaces naturally (or unnaturally, as the case
the dogma wherein all of Society*s faith resides.
^rnlsher11 William Dorrit and the "fair varnisher" Mrs.
ally

personify the choice to erase all intimations of

»r than engage in the imaginative enterprise that would
1 orionize it into a coherent representation of a moral
l

conceives of art —
'

the imaginative perception of

lying potentially deceptive experience — as work,

^ r« emphasizes that it is not the character of gentility
’'’ ‘ff3neral*s insistence that "everything [be] surface and
- <>w without substance" (p. 557) merely articulates the
*5•on not

venture further into the wilderness of

n need be.

Thus it comes as no surprise that Casby,
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a "mere Inn sign post without any Inn" (p. 190), should embody simul
taneously superficiality and indolence:
in hand.

the two in Dickens go hand

Indeed, Casbyfs patriarchal utterances follow a syntactical

pattern of repetition that signifies his imaginative torpor.
Part of the aesthetic stagnation Dickens depicts in Little Dorrit
stems from art’s inability to illustrate anything other than surface,
and from the modem artist’s inability to recreate what he sees in any
image other than his own.

Little Dorrit establishes art as the

primary human profession, but Gowan, the explicit artist figure,
"applies himself to his profession very little" (p. 606). Further,
just as Society chooses to believe only in surfaces, and so to believe
in nothing, so Gowan "has no belief in anyone else, because he has
no belief in himself" (p. 606). The Casbys of the world provide
perfect subjects for the Gowans of the world:

Casby "had been accosted

in the streets, and respectfully solicited to become a Patriarch for
painters and for sculptors" (p. 187).

Similarly, Italy’s "picturesque"

surface lures professional (that is, professed) artists precisely
because it only appears to be.
Henry Gowan can represent nothing.

In the logical terms Little

Dorrit not only invites but reinforces, this means both that he lacks
the imagination to glimpse, and hence to represent, anything (he can
represent nothing) and that he is able to glimpse, and hence to
represent quite accurately, what it nothing (he can represent nothing).
Little Dorrit observes most delicately that, with respect to his
portrait of her father, "I am not quite convinced I should have known
fit] from the likeness if I had not seen him doing it" (p. 606), yet
Gowan’s portrait of Blandois turns out to be an exact, if inadvertent,

image of multivalence and essential nothingness.

In other words, in

its failure to represent anything in particular, the portrait ironically
captures Blandois himself perfectly, for Blandois lacks identity.
Thus when Amy and Fanny visit his studio, Gowan invites them to "’at
least see the original of the daub, that fyou] may know what it’s
meant for.*"

The "original of the daub," however, is himself "a

bravo waiting for his prey, a distinguished noble waiting to save
his country, the common enemy waiting to do somebody a bad turn, an
angelic messenger waiting to do somebody a good turn — whatever you
think he most looks like!’" (p. 5^5)•

Gowan is in the true sense of

the word no artist at all, and he is no artist because he refuses to
confront the intimate relation between art and reality.

In failing to

realize that the artistic imagination provides the only possible means
of apprehending anything other than the surfaces of things, Gowan
becomes a kind of criminal of the imagination.
he, like Society, divorces it from reality.

Marrying art to artifice,

For him, to live the life

of the artist is to "’pass the bottle of smoke.

To keep up the pretence

as to labour, and study, and patience, and being devoted1" (p. ^52).
Art itself, its earning power aside, equals "’hocus-pocus.1"
To Society’s aid, of varnishing moral reality, and to the Gowanesque
art of denying art’s relation to what can in fact be known only through
the intercession of the active imagination, Dickens yokes "the great art
How not to do it" (p. ^55)•

The Circumlocution Office reveals its

raison d’etre to be the artful dodging of reality itself — an art at
last as deceptive (and hence as antithetical to true art) as the
surfaces cultivated by the Merdle coterie, or as the perverse sort
of naturalism at which Henry Gowan excels.

The engaging young

mouthpiece of the Circumlocution Office, Ferdinand Barnacle, glibly
describes its essence:
"Why good Heaven, we are nothing but forms!
Think what a lot of forms you have gone through,
And you have never got any nearer to an end?11
"Never," said Clennam.
"Look at it from the right point of view, and
there you have us — official and effectual" (p. 804) •
The "whole Science of Government" turns out to be the perpetual
generation of memoranda, and of memoranda designed to promote a
veneer of efficiency that lures and vanquishes the real.
Equally important, however, Dickens depicts the art of circum
locution as a falsely imaginative and hence immoral act of apprehension:
"Whatever was required to be done, the Circumlocution Office; was
beforehand with all the public departments in the art of perceiving —
HOW NOT TO DO IT" (p. 1^5) • Society, in perpetual motion, varnishes
and converts reality until it has reduced it to homogeneity, and
indeed to the Dickensian bete noir, anonymity.

Thus Mrs. General,

Bar, Jury, Bishop, and the other "courtiers of the Great and Wonderful
Merdle" (who like his wife and Mrs. Gowan bears no Christian name)
are all in effect innominate.

Similarly, the Circumlocution Office,

concerned only with "keeping this wonderful, all-sufficient wheel of
statesmanship, How not to do it, in motion" (p. 1^6), moves toward
the annihilation of all identity.

Its offense against the real is

also and equally an imaginative and perceptual crime:

because the

Circumlocution Office makes no distinctions among the suppliants
who wander into its line of vision, it automatically converts them
into a single faceless, nameless throng whose members may be "all
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indiscriminately tucked up under £its] foolscap paper" (p. 146).
The three modes of art that Society, Gowan, and the Circumlocution
Office exemplify represent three modes of denial, and three disjunctions
between, reality and its imitation.

Ultimately Dickens condemns all

three forms of artistry on both aesthetic and moral grounds.

Having

established art as a primary act of mind, Little Dorrit dramatizes
both the abuse and the perversion of the imaginative faculty; in
dramatizing those abuses and perversions, it insists all the more
emphatically on art’s status as a primary act of mind.

The Circumlocution

Office, Henry Gowan, and Society all exploit mercilessly the same
technique of fictionalization whereby the ego orients itself to
experience.

In each case, the fictive capacity only rearranges

experience itself, failing to penetrate imaginatively the shadows
and contradictions which unquestionably compose the sensible world —
choosing to interpret them literally rather than anagogically.

Mrs.

Clennam, and to an extent even Arthur, with his unchecked inclination
to regard himself as an old man, also distort their own imaginative
perspicacity, converting what they perceive into a fictive barrier
which effectively isolates them psychically from the rest of the
human world.

Though more complex than those of Society and the

Circumlocution Office, their imaginative machinations also constitute
complete or partial failures of the representative and active
imagination.
In his "Meditations on a Hobby Horse," E. H. Gombrich destinguishes
between the conventional notion of visual art as a representation of
reality and his own conception of art as a substitution for reality
designed expressly to meet the needs of the artist.

Gombrich does
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not go so far as to suppose that something originally intended (of
necessity) to represent reality can become a substitute for it, but
in Little Dorrit Dickens explores such a possibility.

Mrs. Clennam

provides only the most obvious example of the way objective phenomena
may be translated into their subjective doubles.

Like that of Miss

Wade, hers is essentially a mind-forged world whose salient features
have been borrowed from an array of experiential, givens, distorted,
and admixed to corroborate a terrible private creed.

11’The change

I await here,”1 Mrs. Clennam informs anyone who will listen, n!is
the great change*"; yet in the present sense, she "awaits" no change
at all but continually effects it.

Her "Bible, bound like her own

construction of it" (p. 69), objectifies the extent to which fiction
has become a substitute for a psychological and spiritual reality.
Dickens indicates in his monthly number plans for Little Dorrit an
intention to show "people like the houses they inhabit,"^ and at
least with respect to her inoral condition, Mrs. Clennam’s "dim
bed-chamber," with its "black bier-like sofa" and "smell of black
dye" composes a telling aesthetic.
Not, however, simply an objective correlative for Mrs. Clennam’s
repressive state of mind, her bedroom also distinguishes itself
because she has created it ("she never changed her room"), because
quite literally she cannot see beyond it, and because it is equally
illusory and actual.

An early and omniscient description of the

room underscores its phantasmagorical quality, annihilating all
division between its objective and its subjective features:
. . .when it was dusk there early in the afternoon,
changing distortions of herself in her wheeled
chair, of Mr. Flintwinch with his wry neck, of
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Mistress Affery coming and going, would be
thrown upon the house wall, . • . and would
hover there like shadows from a great magic
lantern. As the room-ridden invalid settled
for the night, these would gradually disappear:
Mistress Affery*s magnified shadow always
flitting about, last, until it finally glided
away into the air. . . . Then the solitary
light would burn unchangingly, until it
burned pale before the dawn, and at last died
under the breath of Mrs. Affery, as her shadow
descended on it from the witch-region of
sleep (p. 221).
Perception in Mrs. Clennam1s case ultimately takes the shape of
imaginative conception; "unable to measure the changes beyond £her]
view by any larger standard than the shrunken one of [[her] own
uniform and contracted existence" (p. 3Q8), Mrs. Clennam unconsciously
forces experience to conform to, and at last to confirm, an
especially terrifying dogma whose reality and whose fictional!ty
become identical.
Like numerous other characters in Little Dorrit, Mrs. Clennam
perverts the human creative faculty by "breath^ing] her own image into
a clay image of her Creator."

Yet for Dickens reality cannot be

known except insofar as the mind represents it to itself, and by
the logic the novel establishes, Mrs. Clennam could not hope to know
her "Creator" except insofar as she created him; i.e., except insofar
as she inferred his existence from the experiential particulars that
surrounded her.

In Affery, who turns out to have been, "like greater

people, right in her facts, and always wrong in the theories she
deduced from them" (p. 863)* Dickens provides several clues about
the feature unifying all of the fictions in the novel, for, broken
down into its constituent parts, the imaginative act loosely parallels
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the pattern of deductive reasoning.

The Dickensian imagination

rpoves from the great general facts of existence, which in their
murkiness demand that theories be constructed to explain them, to
the smaller fragments which reflect and clarify them. Such a pattern
is of course finally inductive rather than deductive:

experience

at last confesses itself subordinate to wider truths that underlie
it.

Nevertheless, knowing is clearly imaginative and inferential,

mimetic only in the Platonic sense of mirrors and caves.

One

simultaneously creates and discovers what one knows.
So it is that "no human eyes have ever seen more daring, gross,
and shocking images of the Divine nature than we creatures of the
dust make in our own likeness, of our own bad passions" (p. 8*l4).

The

"Divine nature" provides one potential ordering of reality which
would seem to be less prior to the mind than created by it and which,
because of the faith invested in it, becomes functionally real.

The

past provides another, and in Little Dorrit memory emerges as one
mode of apprehending (through fictional lenses) the real.
legacies invariably bequeath realities —

Thus

the terse and uncompromising

truth, for example, that Mr. F.*s Aunt chirps at appropriate moments
("•You danrt make a head and brains out of a brass knob with nothing
in it!1" £p. 319])* or the "life of degradation" William Dorrit
cannot avoid "bestowing . . . as a sort of portion" (p. 275) upon
his daughter Amy, or the moral imperative ("Do Not Forget") Clennam*s
father bequeaths his son and widow.
Conspicuous throughout the novel, "D.N.F." exemplifies the past
as a reality the present inherits.

Significantly, "D.N.F." also becomes

a kind of Victorian Rorschach, acquiring a different meaning for
anyone who looks upon it, and, for all purposes of thought and action,
becoming whatever it is believed to be.

Mrs. Clennam’s response to

the monogrammed watchcase epitomizes the technique of fictionalization
whereby the ego recreates a reality to its own satisfaction simply
by "deducing theories" from the facts, and gradually coming to believe
in them.

"D.N.F." speaks to Mrs. Clennam "’like a voice from an

angry cloud.

Do not forget the deadly sin, do not forget the appointed

discovery, do not forget the appointed suffering'" (p. 8^4).

Blandois!s

interpretation of this most ambiguous of texts likewise depends upon
its translation into his own particularly sinister language:

"’D.N.F.

was some tender, lovely, fascinating fair-creature, I make no doubt,’"
he decides.

"’I adore her memory on the assumption'" (p. 405).

Mrs.

Clennam’s and Blandois*s versions of "D.N.F." contrast sharply with
that of Arthur Clennam, who, characteristically, reads the monogram
as an injunction to make reparation.
Memory itself , however, demands to be seen as one means by which
the present may be converted into an alternative version of iself.
While remembrance of things past in itself can assist in the apprehension
of the real, the act of recollection also proves eminently capable
of obscuring and altering present circumstance.

Flora Finching and

Arthur Clennam furnish the most dramatic examples of the way memory
can assist in the fictionalization of the present moment by converting
material experience into an immaterial equivalent. But they are
definitely not the only exemplars of such an imaginative technique,
serving rather as foils for Amy Dorrit*s more truly imaginative
orientation to memory and to the past.

33The "moral mermaid," Flora Finching, is a creature half of the
romanticized past and half of a present she romanticizes by insisting
upon its identity to the past.

Upon his reunion with his rose turned

effusive peony, Arthur Clennam notes immediately the "inconsistent
and profoundly unreasonable way in which she instantly went on,
nevertheless7 to interweave their long-abandoned boy and girl relations
with their present interview" (p. 195).

This is of course the

technique whereby Flora makes the present psychologically habitable,
and it is equally an imaginative and a linguistic strategy that allows
her to envelop herself in a fantastic verbal cloak wherein all dis
tinctions between past and present evaporate:
say so, Arthur —

"'Very polite of you to

cannot remember Hr. Clennam until the word is out,

such is the habit of times forever fled, and so true it is that oft
in the stilly night ere slumber's chain has bound people, fond memory
brings the light of other days around people" (p. 315).
Yet for Clennam himself, memory also transforms the present,
recasting immediate experience in the image of the past.

Thus at the

beginning of the novel Clennam returns as much to his own childhood as
to London, and in the coffeehouse listens to a bell whose "sound had
revived a long train of miserable Sundays, and the procession would not
stop with the bell, but continued to march on," returning him to the
"dreary Sunday^s^j of his childhood" (p. 69).

Whereas Flora mixes

memory and desire, for Clennam memory remains until the final chapters
a source of pain which falsifies the present as thoroughly as do his
erstwhile beloved's imaginative transpositions.

Garrett Stewart observes

that memory is to Arthur "no balm but merely a chill restorative of his
blighted past,"^ and this is true as far as it goes.

At last, however,

Clennam1s memory becomes an epistemological tool; Clennam finally
replaces the present with the past in order to apprehend a moral
reality.

Such an act is in itself imaginative, a fictive means to a

very real end.

Elaine Showalter observes that in the Marshalsea

Clennam spends his time "in the cultivation of his own memory, the
'right kind of remembering1 which is a precondition of growth."

In

terested only in the psychic dimensions of Clennam*s imprisonment,
30
Showalter can see his only as a "meditation on self-knowledge,"
but, equally important, it is only through a kind of mental alchemy
that Clennam transposes past and present.

Consequently, his

"meditation" is not simply on "self-knowledge," but ultimately upon
the moral constants underlying the variables and ephemera of empirical
experience.

Such constants, suggested in the flowers Amy Dorrit leaves

Clennam and eventually in her own spectral figure, gradually replace
the miasma of sensory experience that surrounds and sickens him in
the early stages of his imprisonment.
Dickens's insistence that the artificers who "represent Society so
well," Mrs. Merdle and Christopher Casby, speak habitually in "the
imperative mood present tense" leads one to suspect that the truth can
only be narrated in the subjunctive mood past tense.

Just so, in the

Marshalsea Arthur Clennam essentially tells himself "his own poor
story," and specifically the history of his relation with Little Dorrit.
Such a mode of reflection allows him to verify John Chiveiy's suggestion
that Amy loves him and is at once reflective, narrative, and
imaginative, involving a number of hypothetical transpositions ("Con
sider the improbability, -. . . consider the improbability" £p. 798];
"Granted that she had loved him, and he had known it and had suffered
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himself to love her. . . . " \jp. 801]), and culminating in the organi
zation of all experience around a single point of reference whose
actuality can only be comprehended through an imaginative act of faith:
"Looking back upon his own poor story, she was its vanishing-point"
(p. 801).

The vanishing-point passage deserves further explication,

and will receive as much below; in the present context, the passage
affirms simultaneously the triumph of the imaginative memory over
circumstance and the victory of the actual and the permanent over
the artificial and evanescent.
One of the Dorrit family's main transgressions, upon its accession
to "Riches," centers on its refusal to remember.

The chief wrong

it does its youngest member is to forget the past.

Only Frederick

Dorrit (who, tellingly, also "had insensibly acquired a new habit of
shuffling into the picture-galleries . . . and passing hours and
hours before the portraits of renowned Venetians, . . . silently
presenting £his niece Amy] to the noble Venetians" [p. 53^]) masters
the art of memory.

Such an imaginative act of faith instills in an

always murky and indistinct present a kind of clarity and coherence —
by viewing it in the mirror the past provides, Frederick Dorrit
manages to understand the present as it is.

Frederick observes no

difference between present riches and past impoverishment, appearing
in Book Two exactly as he appeared in Book One and identifying at
once the failure of perception that becomes a moral and imaginative
failure as his brother's family forgets its indebtedness to Little
Dorrit.
Little Dorrit herself would seem to excel at the imaginative
conversion of present into past, but her talent for doing so surfaces
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only in the second half of the novel; her fidelity to the prison life
renders both that life and the life in Italy equally unreal:

"With

a remembrance of her father's old life in prison hanging about her
like the burden of a sorrowful tune, Little Dorrit would wake from
a dream of her birth-place into a whole day's dream" (p. 517)•

In

their common unreality, past and present become interchangeable, and
thus Amy appears simply

to trade the new world for the old one:

All that she saw was new and wonderful, but it
was not real; it seemed to her as if those visions
of mountains and picturesque countries might melt
away at any moment, and the carriage, turning
some abrupt comer, bring up with a jolt at the
old Marshalsea gate" (p. 516).
Indeed, throughout the novel, Dickens emphasizes the imagination's
free passage back and forth between the poles it regards as equally
illusory, bat if Amy simply exchanged past for present, little would
distinguish

her imagination from the one that very nearly destroys

Arthur Clennam; if she indiscriminately wove past and present together,
no real distinction would emerge between her continental reverie and
Flora Finching's flights of fancy.

What Amy does, however, is to

turn both the past and the present into mutually qualifying frames of
reference, each of which, imposed imaginatively upon its opposite,
ultimately defines it.

Consequently, Amy "would lean upon her balcony,

and look over at the water, as though they all £all the scenes of her
past] lay underneath it. WTien she got to that, she would musingly
watch its running, as if, in the general vision, it might run dry, and
show her the prison again, and herself, and the old room, and the old
inmates, and the old visitors:
changed" (p. 520).

all lasting realities that had never

37At first glance, Amy Dorrit*s private fictions appear to be ex
ceptions to a general rule of imaginative exploitation. Without
looking too closely, one assumes, with Janet Larson, that Little Dorrit
at best adopts an ambivalent attitude toward the relation between art
and life, and that the novel indeed "exposes a deeper pessimism about,
what artists might accomplish in a culture fundamentally hostile to
imagination and truth.

Dickens's early description of the river

near Twickenham, however, suggests otherwise:

"between the real

landscape and its shadow in the water, there was no division; both
were so untroubled and clear, and, while so fraught with the solemn
mystery of life and death, so hopefully reassuring to the gazer's
soothed heart, because so tenderly and mercifully beautiful" (p. 382).
The passage offers far more than a conventiorsHand slightly sentimental)
pastoral scene; it also proposes an alternative vision of the relation
between life and art — a vision which insists upon their reciprocity
and at the same time corrects the equally moral and imaginative
distortions reflected in Society, in Henry Gowan, in the Circumlocution
Office, and even in the misguided mental propensities of Clennam,
Flora Finching, and Mrs. Clennam.

Ill
"But in public who shall express the unseen ade
quately? It is private life that holds out the
mirror to infinity; personal intercourse, and
that alone, that ever hints at a personality
beyond our daily vision."
— E. M. Forster, Howard's End
The scholars who attempt to salvage the notion that Little Dorrit

in some way affirms, or at least,exculpates, the artistic enterprise
turn inevitably to Amy Dorrit and Daniel Doyce as artist figures,
arguing that, in their modest ways, both characters typify art in bono.
Indeed, one cannot deny that Doyce and Amy together seem to realize
some sort of imaginative ideal.

Nevertheless, because critics have

failed to recognize fictionalization as the way the Dickensian self
makes sense of reality, they have had to translate Amy's artistry, and
that in which Doyce engages, into nc£.artistic terms.

In other words,

Amy Dorrit's life of service, or her capacity for love, or her
gestures of tolerance and forgiveness —
perseverance —

not unlike Doyce1s modest

presumably establish her as the true artist in the

novel, but they do so only metaphorically, with the result that
neither Little Dorrit nor Doyce may be seen as more than a surrogate
artist; neither is quite the real thing.

Edwin Barrett, for example,

considers Amy's "selfless devotion" the "highest function of the
32
fancy, the moral and social imagination operating as love"; Showalter
grants that in Doyce Dickens "seems to be trying to reconcile the
visionary poet with an older conception of the artist as skilled
craftsman"

33 but ultimately his work, like Arthur Clennam*s "morbid

melancholy" can claim little more than an analogical relationship
to the artistic sensibility.
But Dickens is not Henry Gowan, and his main concern lies less
certainly with art as a product or outcome, or indeed with art as
"making" in any concrete, rigorously physical sense of the word, than
with art as an internal process of apprehension,

In the end, the

role and responsibility of the artist in Little Dorrit is only
secondarily to make; Dickens identifies art primarily with seeing.

Such an observation may displease the reader who, accustomed to accept
the stereotypical notion of the ideal Victorian artist as earnest
craftsman, remains perfectly willing to regard the eternally diligent
Doyce and the eternally vigilant Amy Dorrit as diluted but faithful
versions of that ideal.

It may also appear to be inconsistent with

the Dickensian tendency to discriminate "good" characters from "bad"
ones according to the amount of work they do.

It is not, however,

that the artist is not also a maker, but rather that in order to make,
he first must see, and it is this facet of art Dickens examines in
Little Dorrit. At last, the novel illustrates the conception of the
true artist Browning propounds..in Sordello; "the best/impart the
gift of seeing to the rest" (III, 364-65).

Such imparting requires

first not merely sight but insight.
Amy, in short, is an artist; what makes her a finer artist than
virtually everyone around her (Doyce being the possible exception) is
nothing more than her perspicacity, her ability to apprehend the
form not only of the morally good but ultimately of the morally real.
Such an apprehension is an imaginative act because it involves more
than a simple conversion of experience into an alternative version
of itself, requiring further the seeing of what cannot be seen, the
perceiving of what is not immediately perceptible.

The artist in

Little Dorrit exists foAost to make the invisible visible — to
translate it into a recognizable form or, in other words, to represent
what cannot be presented.

In Browning's phrase, he exists to "impart

the gift of seeing to the rest" and in Forster's phrase to "hold out
the mirror to infinity."

Recent criticism has overlooked entirely one

of the novel's central motifs —

that of vision — yet it is only by
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understanding the intimate relation between literal, moral, and
aesthetic vision that one can begin to understand what Dickens truly
means by "art," why he insists upon fiction as a primary act of mind,
and how fiction can serve as a source of social cohesion, and ultimately
of moral redemption.
A return simply to the techniques of representation dramatized in
Little Dorrit discovers a definite pattern in the methods whereby
characters unconsciously convert experience into a version of itself.
"Good" characters like Doyce, Clennam, Mr. Meagles, and most con
spicuously Amy Dorrit construct not so much models of what they see
as representations of what cannot be seen, simulacra which simulate
what otherwise would remain altogether inaccessible.

Again, the world

of Little Dorrit is an ambiguous one whose mysteries remain largely
unsolved and whose connections turn out to be illusory.

Although this

self-contradictory, vacillating world obtrudes relentlessly upon the
senses, it can be known in its entirety only inferentialLy , through
a kind of imaginative induction or extrapolation from the material
particulars it comprises. Thus it becomes more than possible to be
right in the "facts" and, like Affery and "greater people," wrong _
in the theories deduced from them.

In the present sense, Carlisle

correctly deduces that Amy, for example, must "pretend a little" if
she wishes to aknowledge the nature of visible things, for these can
be mirrored only in grotesque, deceptive images.
Nevertheless, that is only half the question, for Dickens preserves
the possibility of deducing "theories" from something other than the
surfaces on display throughout Little Dorrit. The novel suggests also
the necessarily imaginative "imitation of] the goodness of a better
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order of beings" (p. 53).

Such an imitation requires foremost an

extension of the boundaries of the imagination, and, just so, a
widening of perspective and a diversification of point of view.
Imagination, like love in a Shakespearean comedy, looks not with
the eyes but with the mind, and on one level Little Dorrit moves
away from the outward and visible to the inner and spiritual,
replacing the all too concrete particulars of its plot with abstract
realities comprehensible (and communicable) only when the eye
pierces imaginatively the material world.
Far from the last to observe that "the imagination in Little
Dorrit is marked not so much by its powers of particularization as
34 Lionel Trilling came close to
by its powers of generalization,"^
realizing that the only truly moral endeavor in the novel is that
of rendering the general particular and the particular general, of
translating the invisible into a visible frame of reference.

In

his introduction to Bleak House J. Hillis Miller remarks that "as a
blueprint is an image in another form of the building for which it
is a plan, so Bleak House transfers England into another realm, the
35
realm of the fictional imagination."-^ While Miller concludes that
such a blueprint exists to investigate the (social) reality it depicts,
the same activity, directed to different ends, thrives in Little Dorrit,
as much through the efforts of individual characters as through those
of Dickens himself.

Beyond the fog and indeterminacy of its plot,

the novel takes on the shape of a moral blueprint, and the representations
the

true artists in the book make to themselves and to others

emerge as moral paradigms designed to show not the shadows of
tangible experience, but rather the underlying moral reality
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ascertainable only after an imaginative penetration of the great
curtain of empirical "fact."
One of the most striking affinities between Clennam and Amy
Dorrit resides in the disparity between the material circumstances
that have always surrounded them and the alternative moral framework
each constructs and realizes by investing faith in it:*.

Both

Clennam and Amy come of age in settings as horrifying morally as they
are aesthetically, but both are forced to use those settings as
templates for the moral worlds they create and occupy.

Consequently,

the ethical codes they develop bear telling structural similarities
to those around them:

what Amy and Clennam do is to convert those

codes into versions of themselves by
not explicit in them.

seeing something present but

As the New Testament may be interpreted as a

fulfillment of the Old which adopts many of its central tenets and
yet represents a reality that transcends them, so Arthur and Amy at
once represent and convert the experiential givens that surround them.
"As Mr. F. himself said if seeing is believing not seeing is believing
too" (p. 589).
The resemblance between the nightmarish world of Arthur Clennam1s
childhood and the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Clennam*s own
upbringing is telling.

"'You do not know what it is,'" Mrs. Clennam

informs Blandois, "'to be brought up strictly and straitly.
brought up.

Mine was no youth of sinful gaiety and pleasure.

were days of wholesome repression, punishment, and fear.

I was so
Mine

The corruption

of our hearts, the evil of our ways, the curse that is upon us, the
terrors that surround us —
(p. 843).

these were the themes of my childhood'"

Virtually the same "fiery environment" also forms her stepson's
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character — in exactly the opposite shape.

Clennam1s "nature had

been disappointed from the dawn of its perceptions" (p. 72); he
recalls his past as a "legion of Sundays, all days of unserviceable
bitterness and mortification" (p. 69), all presenting to him an
apparent reality that perfectly corroborates Mrs. Clennam1s creed.
At the same time, however, "the fierce dark teaching of his childhood
had never sunk into his heart" (p. 368), and the moral universe
Clennam inhabits seems to owe nothing whatever to experience; indeed,
with respect to perceptible circumstance it is patently unreal, a
seeming conversion pf actuality into its fictive opposite suspiciously
like William Dorritfs genteel fictions, or those of Society.
On closer examination, certain likenesses furthermore emerge
between the inferno of Clennam's existence and the moral blueprint he
makes to represent it.

Clennam describes his parents1 religion as

"*a gloomy sacrifice of tastes and sympathies that were never their
own, offered up as part of a bargain for the security of their
possessions1" (p. 59); the world according to Mrs. Clennam observes
a system of checks and balances.

In Arthur Clennam1s imaginative

version of that world, retribution becomes its double, restitution:
"duty on earth, restitution on earth, action on earth" (p. 368), and
the repayment (rather than the forgiveness) of debt all inform
Clennam1s imaginative architectonic.

Less than evident is the

dissimilarity between Clennam1s consciousness of the necessity of
repaying debt and Mrs. Clennam1s notion that she has been "appointed"
to enforce the vengeful justice of her God.

Here, Arthur's and Mrs.

Clennamfs disparate responses to the "D.N.F." engraved on the
watchcase again prove instructive, for whereas Mrs. Clennam's reading
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is narrow and reductive, informed by her ultimately unimaginative
perception of the world around her, Clennam —

able to conceive "of

all the gentle and good things his life had been without" (p. 206) —
also is capable of reading openly and imaginatively, and of constructing
out of the scattered, ambiguous, visible elements of experience (e.g.,
"D.N.F.") the reality (here the fact of mutual human debt) latent
within them.
An even more profound discernment characterizes Amy's ultimately
imaginative orientation to reality.

Dickens provides the Child of

the Marshalsea a visible template seemingly antithetical to the moral
system she copies from it:
With no earthly friend to help her, or so much
as see her, but the one so strangely assorted;
with no knowledge even of the common daily tone
and habits of the common members of the free
community who are not shut up in prisons; born
and bred in a social condition, false even with
reference to the falsest condition outside the
walls; drinking from infancy of-a well whose
waters had their own peculiar taste . . . the
Child of the Marshalsea began her womanly
life (p. 111).
Yet the "baby whose first draught of air had been tinctured with
Doctor Haggage's brandy" almost immediately sees beyond the spurious
and degenerate world that surrounds her, "perceiv^ing] that it was
not the habit of all the world to live locked up in narrow yards" (p. 108).
Like Clennam, Amy seems merely to convert experience into something
other than what it is, formulating an ethos —

and an aesthetic —

based on standards of delicacy and decency seemingly absent from the
Marshalsea

except in a form essentially debased.

A closer look at

what Amy in fact perceives, however, reveals that it is precisely because
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the prison defines her frame of reference that she is able to see
beyond it; hers emerges as at once the least limited and the most
circumscribed sensibility in the novel.

In Book One as well as in

Book Two Amy regards the world through real and, when those are not
available, through fictive prison bars, and her conception of mutual
and unpayable human indebtedness likewise remains constant regardless
of whether or not she finds herself in the tangible prison that
objectifies that fact.
In simplest terms, the acquisition of moral knowledge is in
Little Dorrit an imaginative act, for it is only through imagination
that surfaces may be penetrated and consequently understood in terms
of the reality that subsumes them.

The first condition of goodness

for George Eliot was to love; for Dickens the first condition of
goodness is to imagine.

Eventually, of course, imagination and love

becomes indistinguishable:

Fanny, for instance, finds Amy's "subject"

to be love (p. 649), and chafes at "the Art of it —

that she was

always being placed [by Amy] in the position of being forgiven, whether
she liked it or not" (p. 646).

Love for Fanny is also a fiction, but

it is a fiction of a very different order, for to think of devotion at
all is, for the elder of the two Dorrit sisters, to "think lightly and
eloquently about degenerate impossibilities" (p. 649)•
Half trope and half theme, "vision" in Little Dorrit unites both
moral and imaginative perception.

Whereas Society's metaphorical

myopia, and William Dorrit*s figurative blindness, underscore their
spiritual and aesthetic obtuseness —

their inability or refusal to

discriminate between ugliness and beauty either in a physical or in a
metaphysical sense — Amy, Daniel Doyce, and at last Arthur Clennam

see clearly.

The “vision” metaphor acquires most significance in the

context of the relation between the ego and what Dickens seems to define
as the art of seeing.

Here at last unambiguous distinctions emerge

between “good” and “bad” imaginative perceptions.
on being seen7 Amy on becoming invisible.

Society concentrates

Society makes a concerted

effort not to see; Amy and Doyce strive only to see, and, in seeing, to
make others see.
vision —

For Society moral and imaginative perception —

are egocentric and self-promoting acts designed to acquire and

to possess; for the true artists in the. novel, seeing itself is sym
pathetic and self-effacing.

The social implications are painfully

obvious, for the imaginative conversions and representations indispensable
to the comprehension of experience become potentially either
charitable or cupidit:ou&.. The spiritual implications are similarly
apparent, for the same acts of fictionalization become potentially
either fideistic or perfidious.
With unconsious irony Henry Gowan confesses to a possible ”*defect
in my mental vision*“ (p. 561)*

Indeed, Gowan exemplifies the moral

myopia that occludes artistic vision and prevents the prospective
artist from imbuing what he represents with the moral beauty that
would endow it with reality.
sightedness.

Gowan is scarcely alone in his short

Merdle “looked out of nine windows in succession and

appeared to see nine wastes of space” (p. 449); Blandois*s eyes “had
no depth or change; they glittered, and they opened and shut.

So far,

and waiving their use to himself, a clockmaker could have made a better
pair” (p. 41).

Fanny “in her mind*s eye” can see only “the fair

bosom that beat in unison with the exaltation of her thoughts,

competing with the bosom that had been famous so long, outshining it,
and deposing it" (p. 672).

Like Mrs. Merdle, always to be found "with

a glass at her eye," and like Edmund Sparkler, perpetually "with a glass
at his eye," and like Barnacle Junior, who "had a superior eye-glass
dangling round his neck, but unfortunately had such flat orbits to
his eyes, and such limp little eyelids that it wouldnft stick in when
he put it up" (p. 149), William Dorrit provides "an illustration of
the axiom that there are no such stone-blind men as those who will
not see" (p. 326).

Indeed, Little Dorrit begins with an image of

seeing that is not seeing —

with "fixedly staring and glaring"

Marseilles, where, although nothing escapes surveillance, neither is
anything definitely seen.

Appearance, as one chapter title suggests,

continually moves toward disappearance, reflecting the impossibility
of acute direct perception and the necessity of its indirect, and
imaginative, counterpart.
One has only to think of Mrs. General*s standard comment upon the
Italian vagrants ("‘They should not be looked at. Nothing unpleasant
should ever be looked at*" £p. 530]) to grasp the extent to which
Society cultivates the great art how not to see it.

At first glance,

the pretense seems internally inconsistent, for at the same time
that Society*s main imaginative impulse directs itself toward not
seeing anything even remotely suggestive of a moral reality, the
Merdle coterie also desires to be seen, and continually insinuates
itself into its own foreground.

Whereas for Amy to be is to perceive,

for Society (which claims as its high priestess the "observed of all
observers," Mrs. Merdle) to be is to be perceived.

Indeed, Society*s

identity is inextricably bound up with its visibility; from its point
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of view, the invisible simply does not exist.
Because Society makes up the "I$ye of the Great World" (p. 655)
whose cynosure it covets, all its perceptions are ultimately self
perceptions, and all of its imaginative acts involve nothing more than
the singularly unimaginative translation of the world into its own
mirror image.

As the object, rather than the subject, of its own

scrutiny, Society imist necessarily fail in artistic terms, for willing
to perceive nothing other than itself, and so to create nothing
other than what it sees (i.e., itself), Society can believe in nothing
other than itself — which is to say that it perforce believes in
nothing.

Such a moral and aesthetic condition links Society explicitly

with Henry Gowan, who likewise neither perceives nor believes in
anything other than himself, and identifies its failures of imagination
with Gowan!s artistic shortcomings.
Dickens1s main concern remains that of figuring forth the unseen,
and he does so in part by showing invisibility to be a 'function more
of subject than of object.

The world seems evanescent and finally

even non-existent because characters refuse to see it in its true
form, or because they force it to confom to false or limited frames
of reference which are themselves nothing more than aspects of the
visible world to which they are applied.

Upon M s liberation from

the Marshalsea, for example, William Dorrit "now saw everything
through their wealth" (p. 670); Fanny Dorrit can only watch her
father-in-law through "waters of vexation" that "had the effect of
making the famous Mr. Merdle, in going down the street, appear to
leap, and waltz, and gyrate" (p. 767)*

Mrs. Clennam finds "the world

k9. . . narrowed to these dimensions11 (p. 231); and Mrs. General strains
all of Italy through her own spurious sieve, "taking all of the colour
out of everything, as Nature and Art had taken it out of herself;
writing Prunes and Prisms in Mr. Eustacefs text, wherever she could
lay a hand; looking everywhere for Mr. Eustace and company, and seeing
nothing else; scratching up the driest little bones of antiquity and
bolting them without any human visitings" (p. 671).
Mrs. General’s response to the Roman ruins epitomizes Social
perception, which shows itself to be a sterile transformation of
circumstance into a narrow and artificial model of it.

Though fictive,

such a mode of orientation to experience is also patently unimaginative,
not only because of its narrowness, but also because of its refusal
to take into account the human element ("visitings"). The way Airy
Dorrit comprehends the same scene reveals a diametrically opposite
mode of perception.

Like Mrs. General, Airy makes sense of the "ruins

of the vast old Ampitheatre, of the old Temples, of the old
commemorative Arches, of the old trodden highways, of the old tombs"
by seeing them imaginatively, that is, by placing them in an invisible
context.

But whereas Mrs. General’s epistemic technique is to

establish and maintain an aesthetic distance between herself and
what she sees, and to diminish what she sees by divorcing it from the
world of feeling, Amy locates what she sees within a wider moral
scheme that is intrinsically human —

and at the same time subordinates

herself to the object of perception.

The ruins, "besides being what

they were, to her were ruins of the old Marshalsea —
old life —

ruins of her own

ruins of the faces and forms that of old peopled it —

ruins of its loves, hopes, cares, and joys" (p. 671).

Viewing ancient

50.
Rome in terms of an expanded and intensely human frame of reference
allows Amy to see it as it truly is, as one of "two ruined spheres of
action and suffering" (p. 671) which unite present and past and
bestow on them an identity attainable only in the context of human
action.

Although Fanny dismisses..her as "Miss Bat" and "little mole,

. . . the blindest of the. blind" (p. 645), Amy clearly is capable
of the deepest, most complex and penetrating vision in the novel.
The same stereoptic quality characterizes her response to Italy
in general.

Amy’s emerges as a kind of converging double vision

which encompasses the depth, breadth and height of human experience,
as well as the affective texture that, once apprehended, bestows upon
life the reality and visibility it otherwise lacks.

Necessarily

imaginative, the primary act of mind is more imaginative in Little
Dorrit than in any other character in the novel.

Thus Amy spends

most of her unhappy Italian sojourn simply watching:

"she would

musingly watch [the river] running as if, in the general vision, it
might run dry, and show her the prison, and herself" (p. 520).

Cor

respondingly, what she sees inevitably dwarfs Amy’s already "little
figure."

Standing on the hotel balcony, "Little Dorrit was little

indeed" (p. 520), and threatens at any moment to vanish altogether.
At the same time, however, Amy is no smaller or less significant than
she appears to be at the beginning of the nobel, when she "comers]
out like a little ghost, and vanishes] away without a sound" (p. 127).
Although Affery regards her as "nothing, . . . a whim of [Mrs.
Clennam’s]" (p. 80), Little Dorrit*s evasiveness differs dramatically
from that of Mr. Merdle, who similarly shrinks and subsides whenever
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he finds "himself observed or listened to."

Merdle seems always about

to disappear because he is himself nothing; Amy precisely because she
is something.

Merdle*s role with respect to the world around him,

like that of Midas with respect to the world around him, is essentially
to reify it; Amy’s role is to realize everything she touches.

The

true nature of Amy*s invisibility discloses itself near the end of
the novel, when Clennara recognizes her as the "vanishing-point" in
"his own poor story":
Everything in its perspective led to her
innocent figure. He had travelled thousands
of miles towards it; previous unquiet hopes
and doubts had worked themselves out before
it; it was the centre of interest in his life;
it was the termination of everything that was
good and pleasant in it; beyond, there was
nothing but mere waste and darkened sky (p. 802).
In many ways, Little Dorrit itself focuses on the vanishing-point
passage, and Richard Stang does not mistakenly find Amy the vanishing
point "in the same sense Cordelia would be considered the vanishing
point in the design that is King Lear." Stang continues: "Here
Dickens uses the language of realistic perspective painting as prac
ticed since Piero della Francesca, painting that aimed to give the
illusion of real space rather than the sort of highly stylized and
grotesque vision of the preceding passage describing the English
tourists."
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The correspondence between the vanishing point in

Renaissance art and its Dickensian counterpart might usefully be
pursued.

Da Vinci’s "perspective of disappearance" required the

artist to identify, with mirrors, the point at which all background
faded into nothingness; transferring such a point to his own canvas,
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the artist could enhance the reality of what he depicted.

Just as

Dickens makes Amy Dorrit the vanishing point in his canvas, so Amy
comes to occupy the same position in the canvas of Arthur Clennam*s
perceptions.

As the "vanishing-point" Amy —

precisely because of

her ability to melt into the background — makes the unseen seen,
eventually endowing the invisible with identity, dimension, and,
ultimately, reality.
The vanishing-point passage derives significance from areas other
than those which establish the nature of Amy!s relation to her
surroundings, for it also announces Clennam's ascension to the mode
of artistic perception Little Dorrit both practices and personifies.
In Clennam Dickens dramatizes the education of the imagination.
Throughout the narrative, the imaginative conversions Clennam makes
serve only partially as foils for the techniques of fictionalization
whereby other characters in -the novel either destructively or
self-destructively orient themselves to reality.

Although Clennam*s

fancy often works in bono, many of the ways in which he confronts
experience resemble nothing so strongly as those with which Mrs.
Clennam and Society alter the external world.

It is only during his

imprisonment that Clennam learns definitely not only Showalter's
"right kind of remembering" but equally, if not more, important, the
right kind of imagining which allows him at last to attain the moral
and artistic status only Aiijy Dorrit and Daniel Doyce claim con
sistently.
In the present sense, Larson mistakenly supposes that Doyce "finally
reflects Dickens’s skepticism toward the Romantic artist" because he
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has no apprentices.^

To draw such a conclusion is not just to read

much too allegorically the relation between Doyce as inventor and
Doyce as artist (Doycean invention is art) but further to overlook
Clennam*s own role as Doyce*s apprentice.

Quite simply, Clennam

learns the mode of vision which allows Dickens to describe Doyce
thus:
He had the power, often to be found in union
with such a character, of explaining what he
himself perceived, and meant, with the direct
force and distinctness with which it struck
his own mind. . . . There was something almost
ludicrous in the complete irreconcilability of
a vague, conventional notion that he must be
a visionary man with the precise, sagacious
travelling of his eye -and thumb over the plans.
. . . His dismissal of himself from his
description was hardly less remarkable. He
never said, I discovered this adaptation or
invented that combination; but showed the
whole thing as if the Divine artificer had
made it and he had happened to find it (p. 570).
Throughout his characterization of Doyce, Dickens stresses that
the inventor is not only a Maker-see but that he is a Maker-see
because he is primarily a seer —

a ’’visionary man” whose representations

of reality depend first upon an imaginative perception of that
reality and second upon an investment of faith in it.

Doyce*s

emerges as exactly the same sort of acuity which allows Amy Dorrit to
see ”in ^Clennam]] what no one else could see” (p. ^32).

That acuity

consists in an ability to grasp the nature of what cannot be seen
but only represented, and indeed which can be known directly only
through faith —

’’the evidence,” as St. Paul had it, ”of things not

seen.” Thus Doyce regards the work of the "Divine artificer” with
”a pleasant tounch of respect, . . . mingled with [a^J quiet admiration
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of it . . .so calmly convinced he was that it was established on ir
refragable laws” (p. 570).

Amy likewise allows her faith, for example

in her father* s former self, to contradict what seems to be true of him,
saying to herself "in a burst of sorrow and compassion *No, no, I have
never seen him in my life!1" (p. 276).
By contrast, an absence of faith appears to cripple Clennam*s mode
of imaginative apprehension from the beginning.

Fancy provides him a

means of escape from experience, and Clennam consciously resists the
possibility that fancy may also be used to comprehend experience.

His

relation to Flora Finching reflects his infidelity to his own
imaginative perceptions, "for while all that was hard and stem in his
recollection, remained Reality on being proved — was obdurate to the
sight and touch, and relaxed nothing of its old indomitable grimness —
the one tender recollection of his experience would not bear the same
test, and melted away" (p. 206).

Clennam*s subsequent fictions

likewise falsify rather than verify the morally real, because implicitly
they verify only what is visible, and because they quite literally
presuppose an investment of faith in nothing.

The Nobody fictions

provide a perfect case in point, and resemble far more the mental
machinations which allow Society to convert what it perceives into
emptiness and anonymity than, for example, Little Dorrit*s imaginative
transpositions of Italy and the Marshalsea, or Daniel Doyce*s talent
for rendering the invisible visible.
Yet Clennam*s initial failure consciously to invest moral confidence
in what he grasps imaginatively should not be confused with a simple
lack of faith, for it is less the case that Clennam lacks faith itself
than that he lacks either the w i H or the ability to acknowledge the

convictions he does possess:

"He was a dreamer in such wise, because

he was a man who had, deep-rooted in his nature, a belief in all the
gentle and good things his life had been without" (p. 206).

Aray*s

love for Clennam emerges as synecdoche for the invisible moral reality
that can only be grasped imaginatively; throughout most of the novel,
Clennam*s attempts to invest his faith in the shabbier fabric of
experience the world seems to offer him (objectified in the misbegotten
Merdle investments) preclude the creativity and intelligence of
vision that would allow him to perceive and acknowledge that reality.
Thus "he heard the thrill in £Amy*s] voice, he saw her earnest face, he
saw her clear true eyes . . . and the remotest suspicion of the truth
never dawned upon his mind.

No.

He saw the devoted little creature

with her worn shoes, in her common dress, in her jail-home; . . . and
the light of her domestic story made all else dark to him" (p. ^33) •
During his long imprisonment and illness, Clennam ceases gradually
to evade experience by translating it into the fanciful constructions
which underscored his affinity with William Dorrit.

Instead, he learns

to substitute for the immediate reality of the prison the underlying
moral reality which encompasses and qualifies it, and which can only be
known while he is "dozing and dreaming without power of reckoning time."
The fusion of dream and fact that informs Little Dorrit*s return reflects
the extent to which imaginative constructs have become for Clennam not
just a means of tolerating the burdensome bell he hears at the beginning
of the novel, or the painful fact that Pet Meagles is not in love with
him, but, above all, modes of apprehending comprehensively and accurately
a moral actuality that can be known in no other way.
appears to step cut of Clennam*s own fantasy:

Little Dorrit

"the door of his room
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seemed to open to a light touch, and . . . a quiet figure seemed to
stand there, with a black mantle on it.

It seemed to draw the mantle

off and drop it on the ground, and then seemed to be his Little Dorrit
in her old, worn dress.

It seemed to tremble and to clasp its hands,

and to smile, and to burst into tears" (pp. 82^-25).

But at the same

time Clennam also recognizes Amy to be "a living presence," and no longer
simply the "heroine" of a "domestic story."

The virtually invisible

Little Dorrit becomes visible in her true form only after "the Pupil of
the Marshalsea" has cultivated his own mental .vision, suspended dis
belief, and learned to extend the frontiers of his own imagination.
Amy, in other words, is not the only necessary angel to descend at the
end of Little Dorrit.
In addition to the imaginative faith almost entirely absent from
his earlier attempts to orient himself to reality, Clennam learns what
might be called imaginative charity.

Throughout Little Dorrit Clennam-

esque fancy defines itself in terms of its inwardness; almost to the last,
Clennam shares his extraordinarily private fictions with no one.
Consequently, they intensify the chronic melancholy that imprisons-,and
threatens to destroy him.

Like the Nobody fictions, the Flora Finching

fictions of his youth demonstrate Clennam1s imaginative isolation in
middle age:
In his youth he had ardently loved this woman,
and had heaped upon her all the locked-up
wealth of his affection and imagination. That
wealth had been, in his desert home, like
Robinson Crusoe's money; exchangeable with no
one, lying idle in the dark to rust until he
poured it out for her. Ever since that memor
able time he had, until the night of his
arrival, as completely dismissed her from any
association with his Present or Future as if

57.
she had been dead. . . • M e had kept
the old fancy of the Past unchanged, in
its oldv*sacred place (p. 191)*
This doomed hoarding of fictions parallels those of Chivery, with
his secret epitaphs, and Affery, with her uncommunicated 11dreams,11 and
it counterpoints the outwardness of Amy’s and Doycefs imaginative
lives.

Doyce1s designs automatically objectify his own recognitions:

• for him to see is, again in Browning’s terms, simultaneously to see
and to impart the gift of seeing to the rest.

Amy reflects even more

clearly the Pauline willingness to communicate that is indispensable
to the truly artistic vision.

Story, in fact, turns out to be one

of the few currencies Amy possesses, and she dispenses it freely.
Four examples will illustrate the principle of narrative charity Amy
embodies — a principle which sets her apart from Affery, who steadfastly
keeps her dreams to herself even when to articulate them would be to
dispel some of the circumstantial murk that permeates the house of
Clennam.
The scene in which Amy introduces Maggy to Clennam seems minor
enough until one begins to examine its narrative texture, for in it
Amy tells Maggy’s ”history,” adopting the "tone of telling a child’s
story” (p. 1^3), and concluding the pathetic tale on a note of utterly
false cheer:

”’And that,1 said Little Dorrit, clapping the two great

hands together, ’is Maggy’s history as Maggy knows! 111 In the course
of the stoxy, Amy at once fictionalizes and realizes experience;
indeed, she can only impart the truth of Maggy’s situation in the guise
of a fiction, for in this case story emerges as the only conscionable
mode of communication, and one which preserves Maggy’s dignity at the
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same time that it manages to convey to Clennam the story within the
story, and the actual horror of Maggy*s past.
Many zealous critics have scrutinized the curious f,Tale of .the
Princess,n yet the story resists elucidation, suggesting its own cen
trality to the theme of narrative that runs through Little Dorrit (it
is after all the only explicit story in the novel) without yielding up
the exact nature of its relation to the rest of the book.

Randolph

Splitter dismisses the story as "a sentimental fairy tale about ^Little
Dorrit1s] secret Prince Charming11

for Larson, the telling of the tale

constitutes an 11escape into a confessional story . . . both necessary
and finally unsuccessful in opening a new way of salvation for the
suffering soul'1 and indicating “only the failure of narrative in the
face of realities in which princesses know more than fairy tales promise.*"39
Carlisle finds the stoiy nothing more than Amy Dorrit !s 11grotesque
comment on her sense of identity:

she becomes a corpse united to a

shadow.11^
In fact, the tale*s psychological value to Little Dorrit (for
Barbara Hardy the story is “uttered . . . reticently, in release and
relief" -v remains secondary to its significance to the concept of
fictionalization Dickens figures forth in the course of the novel.
The tale, like all of Little Dorrit*s narratives, is designed to
reveal the structure of reality —

in this case, the nature of Amy's

\

feeling for Arthur Clennam.

It does so through indirection, by

translating affective facts into images which reflect their true
identity in a way overt, factual statement could not.

Amy*s love for

Clennam can only be apprehended imaginatively; abstract and invisible,

59it refuses to be known except in a series of fictive reflections of
itself.

If love may be taken as one of the moral realities which can

only be communicated and comprehended through techniques of fictionalization, the story's function becomes apparent.

As an equally

imaginative and communicative act, narrative emerges as a truly moral
mode of discourse:

the “Tale of the Princess" illustrates the

mechanisms of indirection whereby fiction confronts reality, absorbs
it, and at last gives it up again in its true form.
The story is far more successful than Larson supposes in imparting
to Maggy the truths it illuminates.

Maggy herself can only compre

hend Little Dorrit*s meaning by translating it into her own private
lexicon, which equates love with "chicking" and "the Hospital."
Perceiving the absence of love to afflict Little Dorrit*s "tiny
woman," Maggy proposes that "they ought to have took her to the
Hospital, . . . and then she*d have got over it" (p. 3^2).

More to

the point, the story mirrors exactly the actual spiritual states of
the characters it translates into their fictional counterparts.
Arthur Clennam, by this time immersed in the Nobody fictions, jls. a
shadow, and the story furthermore recognizes the fate both of hoarded
fictions and of those who hoard them.
Amy's two letters to Clennam most clearly mirror the right use of
the imagination as a mode of moral knowledge.

They emphasize the com

prehensiveness and empathy of vision possible only through a
conscientious application of the imagination.

The letters themselves

are stories which reveal only through indirection a number of moral
realities, the state of Pet's marriage to Gowan and Amy's feeling for
Clennam chief among them.

In the letters Amy adopts a number of points

60.
of view — most notably those of Clennam ("I had only been watchful for
you, and had only noticed what I think I have noticed, because I was
quickened by your own interest in it" £p. 6o8j) and Pet ("I fancy I
don't look at it with my own eyes, but with hers" £p. 605~\) —

each

time surrendering herself to the alternative points of view that, allow
her to envision and correspondingly to reveal the truth about what
she sees.
Indeed, Amy's meditations take the steadfastly subjunctive mood
by which Clennam represents to himself the moral realities he comes
to believe in at the end of the novel.

"I could not keep it out of

my mind," Amy writes, "that if I was Mrs. Gowan . . . I should feel
that I was rather lonely and lost, for the want of some one who was
steadfast and firm in purpose.

I even thought she felt this want a

little, almost without knowing it.

But mind you are not made uneasy

ty this, for she was 'very well and very happy.*
beautiful" (p. 521).

And she looked most

The narrative mode, and the imaginative trans

positions it requires in order to exist, allow Amy to reveal the
stable pattern underlying the ambiguous texture of fact that has
presented itself to her.

A multiplicity of perspectives, each attained

through an imaginative projection of self into other, ultimately
reveals the truth.

Amy looks simultaneously through Clennam's eyes,

through Pet's eyes, through her own "I," and through the eternal frame
of reference, the prison bars.

The act is as sympathetic as it is

imaginative, as moral as it is fictional.
Mutatis mutandis, Little Dorrit itself deliberately assumes a
number of perspectives, in striking contrast to the other "dark novels,"
Bleak House and Great Expectations, with their rigorous adherence to
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one or two discrete points of view.

Dickens*s monthly number plans for

Little Dorrit reveal a determination to incorporate into the story as
many points of view as possible.

Devising the "Moving in Society"

chapter, for example, Dickens decides that everything will be "indistinctly
JkO

seen, as Little Dorrit saw it";
Self-Tormentor" read:

his notes for the "History of a

"From her own point of view.

44
Dissect it" ;

approaching the end of the novel, Dickens resolves to "tell the whole
story, working it out as much as possible through M1*3, Clennam herself."2*2*'
Little Dorrit comprises a dizzying number of perspectives, becoming a
tale told by everybody and by nobody —
nobody sees the events it describes.

exactly as everybody and yet

At the same time, the novel

acknowledges the dependence of all moral determinations upon point of
view, suggesting that the angle of perception (like the angle of in
cidence) inevitably determines the meaning of what is seen (the angle
of reflection).
Dickens begins one of the critical chapters in Book One, "Little
Dorrit*s Party," by remarking that "this history must sometimes see
with Little Dorrit*s eyes, and shall begin that course t?y seeing [[Arthur
Clennam]]" (p. 208).

The subsequent narrative, which includes the

imaginative conversion of the stars into dancers at a party, emphasizes
the contingency of meaning upon the orientation of the observer and,
more important, upon the comprehensiveness of’his point of view.

Reality

becomes an inevitably subjective phenomenon whose subjectivity can be
vanquished only when it calls attention to itself and in calling attention
to itself ironically extends itself.

Thus Little Dorrit*s view of

Clennam*s "‘dim room" is informed not only by the "courtly ideas, . . .
costly ideas, . . . picturesque ideas" noted above, but also by "desolate

ideas, . . . teeming ideas" which "made the room dimmer than it was
in Little Dorrit*s eyes as they timidly saw it from the door" (p. 208).
The comprehensiveness of Amy Dorrit*s vision, in short, transcends
its own subjectivity.
Nevertheless, Little Dorrit continues to stress the apparent
relativity of meaning.

At the convent of the Saint Bernard, William

Dorrit insists "that the
tracted.

apace was so — ha — hum —

so very con

More than that, it was always the same, always the same1.' (p.

493) • The host, on the contrary, suffers no sense of confinement
whatever —

"almost all objects had their various points of view,

Monsieur, and he did not see this poor life of his from the same point
of view.

Monsieur was not used to confinement" (p. 493)*

Clearly

Dorrit and the host occupy opposing imaginative poles, each identified
by;the .extent to which perspectives are imaginatively widened, or
imaginatively narrowed, as the case might be.

Dorrit!s inability to

see the convent except in terms of his own history of confinement
counterpoints the host1s imaginative flexibility and the comprehensivenes
of his mental vision:

"Monsieur could not easily place himself in the

position of a person who had not the power to choose, I will go here
to-morrow, or there next.1day; I will pass these barriers, I will enlarge
those bounds.

Monsieur could not realize, perhaps, how the mind

accommodated itself to such things in the force of necessity" (p. 494;
).
The irony, of course, is that "Monsieur" has spent the first half
of the..novel "in the position of a person who had not the power to
choose"; his failure to recall that "position" underscores his
imaginative feebleness.

Finally, Ferdinand Barnacle's visit to the

imprisoned and afflicted Arthur Clennam includes a most enlightening
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Office, whose identity the engaging young Barnacle correctly finds to
depend on the perspective from which it is studied.

11'You don't

regard it from the right point of view,*" Barnacle tells Clennam.
"lit is the point of view that is the essential thing.

Regard our

place from the point of view that we only ask you to leave us alone,
and we are as capital a Department as you'll find anywhere. . . • Look
at it from the right point of view and there you have us — official
and effectual*" (p. 804).
The "right point of view" Barnacle proposes is of course very much
the wrong point of view, but his glib assertions to the contrary
bring to the surface the questions about "right" and "wrong" perspective
which underlie Little Dorrit from the beginning.

There would seem to

exist no definite standard to determine which perceptions are wrong
and which right:
reality —

all perceptions —

all imaginative orientations to

their inevitability notwithstanding, must be held suspect.

(In terms of modem literary theory, all texts are indeterminate in
meaning and all interpretations are therefore equally valid.)

Clennam*s

ultimate response to Little Dorrit would seem to reinforce such a
notion, for it too appears to confirm moral and aesthetic relativity:
"The same deep timid earnestness that he had always seen in her, and
never without emotion, he saw still.

If it had any new meaning that

smote him to the heart, the change was in his perception, not in
her" (p. 826).

A closer examination of the passage, however, especially

in the context of the ideas of comprehensiveness of vision and
imaginative extension Dickens develops in the course of the novel,
discovers not what Larson calls "the puzzlement of the artist tlying
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to speak f
:the plain truth* in a world of 'twilight judgments, mists
and obscurities* where fiction seems inevitable and inevitably morally
ambiguous,"

but rather an affirmation of truly artistic vision, and ef

the "right perception" it brings with it.
Although insistent upon a multiplicity of points of view, Dickens
never truly denies the possibility of right perspective, often con
firming that possibility in negative terms which illustrate the wrong46
ness of certain points of view.
All such moral and aesthetic
vantage points nevertheless share at least two common features: they
are egocentric and they are correspondingly limited and self-imprisoning.
Mrs. Clennam*s perspective, for example, amounts to an absence of
perspective, an imaginative confinement reflected in a moral and
aesthetic universe so "narrowed" that its sole occupant loses all
ability to conceive of the world outside her room.

Miss Wade prides

herself on her observational acuity ("From a very early age I have
detected what those about me thought they hid from me" [[p. 725])*
but her "history" demonstrates nothing so clearly as the narrowness,
rigidity, and perverse narcissism that control her imaginative life.
Because Little Dorrit itself, like Amy Dorrit's fictions, incor
porates numerous points of view, Miss Wade's "history" betrays its
own limitations and ultimately its own utter inaccuracy as a mirror
of reality, i.e., as an account of her past and an explanation of her
present.

One sees at once, for instance, that what Miss Wade interprets

as "fair words and fair pretences" to be "penetrated below" (p. 728)
are actually gestures of kindness.

Yet little in the "History of a

Self-Tormentor" itself (its title aside) distinguishes it from the
work of a legitimately enraged imagination like that of Jane EJyre.

What exposes the illegitimacy of the "history" is in part the narrative
technique of the novel in which it appears, which has already
approached Miss Wade from a number of directions.

The novel asks of

its reader a comprehensiveness of vision which will permit him to
reject Miss Wade's perceptions as false and limited.

Indeed, Dickens

went to great pains to weave the "history" into Little Dorrit, expressing
to his biographer John Forster the intention of "mak[ing] the blook
of the book circulate through both."47' Precisely because the blood of
the book circulates through both the main and the interpolated story,
Miss Wade's narrative lends itself to a study of perspective in Little
Dorrit: by presenting several points of view and demanding not that
the reader choose among them, but rather that he take all of them
into account, the novel transcends each of the discrete perspectives
it encompasses and comments upon all of them so delicately and
indirectly as to reveal unquestionably the psychological, social, and
moral realities they express synecdochally'.
Ultimately the novel forms its own comprehensive and multifarious
point of view, which in its comprehensiveness and internal diversity —
in its imaginativeness —

represents a reality external to itself in

a way most of the fictions it incorporates and describes could not hope
to do.

It is only by understanding Little Dorrit*s own point of view,

and the way it achieves that point of view through the sympathetic and
imaginative adoption of a multiplicity of perspectives, that one can
begin to accept the possibility that certain perceptions are indeed
more right than others, and that what makes them so i£ the degree of
artistic and imaginative integrity with which they have been achieved.
For to take a number of points of view is necessarily an imaginative

feat, involving ultimately the creative conversion of perceived experience
into something other than what it appears to be.

Thus Dickens can not

only state but further affirm that "none of us clearly know to whom or
to what we are indebted in this wise, until some marked stop in the
whirling wheel of life brings the right perception with it" (p. 78?) •
When Amy Dorrit returns to Clennam he sees her less from an altogether
novel perspective than from a more complex and inclusive and novelistic
ones

i'The same deep timid earnestness he had always seen in her . . .

he saw still."
The path from the acts of fictionalization whereby all characters
in Little Dorrit orient themselves to experience, through the fictions
which elucidate and communicate the nature of reality, to the
determination that the frontiers of imagination are tovextended rather
than denied is a steep and treacherous one indeed.

Deliberately

complex and ambiguous, the novel approaches from a number of perspectives
a vision of human reality which at last can only be inferred imaginatively
from the clues the narrative itself provides.
would seem to be less

Dickens's intention

announce the nature of reality by making a

number of moral and social pronouncements upon the subject of mutual
human indebtedness, or the necessity of love, than to explore and
even to celebrate the avenues of imagination whereby the real is at
last perceived.
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2 Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Harraondsworth, 1971), p- 887•
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